


Motivation. How can we understand the contribution of single agents in large multi-agent systems?





Results & Conclusions

1. Fairness & stability metrics can be learned. Stability is harder.

Table 1: Comparison of predictive performance across test datasets and solution concepts.

	Least core payoffs		Least core excess		Shapley values		Banzhaf indices	
Dataset	Mean MAE		MAE		Mean MAE		Mean MAE	
	Fixed	Variable	Fixed	Variable	Fixed	Variable	Fixed	Variable
In-sample	0.030	0.043	0.015	0.034	0.019	0.022	0.018	0.028
Out-of-sample	0.030	0.044	0.015	0.027	0.018	0.036	0.018	0.056
Slightly out-of-distribution	0.029	0.028	0.015	0.050	0.018	0.019	0.017	0.018
Moderately out-of-distribution	0.030	0.035	0.014	0.029	0.018	0.026	0.018	0.032
Significantly out-of-distribution	0.031	0.045	0.014	0.036	0.018	0.029	0.018	0.039






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Neural payoff machines: Predicting *fair* and *stable* payoff allocations among team members



Shapley Values


Number of players

0.05

0.00

Speedup of Neural Network Shapley Prediction (Ours) versus SHAP Kernel Explainer

2. Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, Netherlands



References

E. Elkind, L. A. Goldberg, P. W. Goldberg, and M. Wooldridge. Computational complexity of weighted threshold games. In AAAI, pages 718–723, 2007

X. Deng and C. H. Papadimitriou. On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts. Mathematics of operations research, 19(2):257-266, 1994.

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Set of players $N=\{1,2,\ldots,n\}$ Set of weights $\mathbf{w} = (w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n)$

Quota (threshold) q

Characteristic function $\,v:2^N o \{0,1\}\,$

Maps each coalition $C \subseteq N$ to a value v(C)

Stability

The least core

s.t. $\sum p_i \ge 1 - \varepsilon \quad \forall C \in C^{\min}$ $\sum_{i \in N} p_i = 1$ $\forall \, i \in N$ $p_i \ge$

$$C^{\min} \equiv \left\{ C \subseteq N \; \middle| \; C \neq \varnothing, \sum_{i \in S} w_i \ge q, \text{ and, for all } j \in C, \sum_{i \in C \setminus \{j\}} w_i < q
ight\}$$

