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Bayesian Model of Behaviour in Economic Games
Debajyoti Ray · Brooks King-Casas · P. Read Montague · Peter Dayan

Mon Dec 08 08:45 PM -- 12:00 AM (PST) @

Classical Game Theoretic approaches that make strong rationality assumptions have difficulty modeling observed behaviour in Economic games of human subjects. We investigate the role of finite levels of iterated reasoning and non-selfish utility functions in a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process model that incorporates Game Theoretic notions of interactivity. Our generative model captures a broad class of characteristic behaviours in a multi-round Investment game. We invert the generative process for a recognition model that is used to classify 200 subjects playing an Investor-Trustee game against randomly matched opponents.

Author Information

Debajyoti Ray (End Cue)
Brooks King-Casas
P. Read Montague
Peter Dayan (Gatsby Unit, UCL)

I am Director of the Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit at University College London. I studied mathematics at the University of Cambridge and then did a PhD at the University of Edinburgh, specialising in associative memory and reinforcement learning. I did postdocs with Terry Sejnowski at the Salk Institute and Geoff Hinton at the University of Toronto, then became an Assistant Professor in Brain and Cognitive Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before moving to UCL.

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