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Poster
Efficient Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization in Games with Many Player Actions
Richard G Gibson · Marc Lanctot · Neil Burch · Duane Szafron

Mon Dec 03 07:00 PM -- 12:00 AM (PST) @ Harrah’s Special Events Center 2nd Floor

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is a popular, iterative algorithm for computing strategies in extensive-form games. The Monte Carlo CFR (MCCFR) variants reduce the per iteration time cost of CFR by traversing a sampled portion of the tree. The previous most effective instances of MCCFR can still be very slow in games with many player actions since they sample every action for a given player. In this paper, we present a new MCCFR algorithm, Average Strategy Sampling (AS), that samples a subset of the player's actions according to the player's average strategy. Our new algorithm is inspired by a new, tighter bound on the number of iterations required by CFR to converge to a given solution quality. In addition, we prove a similar, tighter bound for AS and other popular MCCFR variants. Finally, we validate our work by demonstrating that AS converges faster than previous MCCFR algorithms in both no-limit poker and Bluff.

Author Information

Richard G Gibson (University of Alberta)
Marc Lanctot (University of Alberta)
Neil Burch (University of Alberta)
Duane Szafron (University of Alberta)

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