Solving Large Sequential Games with the Excessive Gap Technique

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Extensive-Form Games



Applications - poker

Nash Equilibrium approximation used in recent breakthroughs

- Heads-Up Limit Texas Hold'Em [Bowling et al. 2015]
- Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'Em [Brown and Sandholm 2017, Moravcik et al. 2017]
- CFR, or variants, used to compute equilibria





How compute a zero-sum Nash equilibrium

Linear programming [von Stengel 96]

Simplex and IPM too slow in practice

CFR and variants [Zinkevich et al. 07, Tammelin et al 15]

 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}}$ in theory Better than $\frac{1}{T}$ in practice

First-order methods, [Hoda et al 10, Kroer et al 18]

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\frac{1}{T} in theory
\frac{1}{T} in practice
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Practical Excessive Gap Technique

We introduce a practical variant of EGT

- EGT constructs smoothed approximations to the optimization problems faced by each player [Nesterov 05, Hoda et al 10, Kroer et al 18]
- We use dilated entropy DGF from [Kroer et al 18]
- Aggressive stepsizing
- Balancing of smoothing on each player
- Numerically-friendly smoothed best response computation
- GPU parallelization across different hands dealt

Experiments

Real-time subgames from Brains vs AI competition

Last betting round of game

43k/86k actions per player, 54M leaves

EGT with Kroer et al 18 smoothing function

Our Aggressive EGT

Three CFR variants

Comparison to existing algorithms

Endgame 7



Conclusion

- We introduce aggressive EGT variant
- Give first comparison of FOMs and CFR on real, large-scale games
- First-order methods can be made faster than all but the best practical variant of CFR

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