NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS

Navigating the Safety Landscape: Measuring Risks in Finetuning LLMs




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Previous studies found that the safety alignment of LLMs was compromised by fine-tuning with only a few adversarially designed training examples.



Image credit to Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!

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

Are all open-source LLMs equally vulnerable to finetuning?

Why can simple finetuning easily break LLM's safety alignment?

How fast does the model start to break during finetuning?

Image credit to Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!

We discover that all these questions can be addressed by navigating the LLM safety landscape

Safety Basin: Random perturbations to model weights maintain the safety level of the original aligned model within its local neighborhood. However, outside this local region, safety is fully compromised, exhibiting a sharp, step-like drop.



LLM safety basins exist regardless of the harmfulness evaluation metrics and safety datasets.



Evaluation metrics: Keyword detection & Llama Guard2

Safety datasets: AdvBench and POSEBench

Safety vs. Capability Landscape:

The shape of the LLM capability landscape is *drastically different from* the one in the safety landscape



LLM Safety Landscape



LLM Capability Landscape

Harmful finetuning compromises safety by dragging the model away from the safety basin



Finetuning on few-shot harmful data drags model away from safety basin

Finetuning on mixture of harmful and safe data helps model stay within safety basin

VISAGE Safety Metric:

Measures the LLM safety after finetuning via the average depth of the safety basin

$$\text{VISAGE} = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\alpha \sim \mathcal{U}(-a,a), \beta \sim \mathcal{U}(-b,b), \ldots} [\mathcal{S}_{max} - \mathcal{S}(\alpha, \beta, \ldots)], \text{ s.t. } \mathcal{S} < \mathcal{S}_{max}$$

Model	VISAGE	AdvBench Samples	Aligned	10-shot	50-shot	100-shot	mix
LLaMA2-7B-chat	85.32	80	0	90.0	91.3	100.0	0
		520	0.2	85.2	90.2	95.4	0.2
Vicuna-7B-v1.5	73.26	80	5.0	95.0	97.5	100.0	1.3
		520	2.5	89.2	94.0	96.7	1.2

LLM safety landscape also highlights the system prompt's critical role in protecting a model, and that such protection transfers to its perturbed variants within the safety basin



Safety Landscape of Mistral-7B-instruct-v0.1



Safety Landscape of Vicuna-7B-v1.5

We find that jailbreaking prompts are highly sensitive to perturbations in model weights

A naive defense method is to perturb the model weights before generating the response





github.com/poloclub/llm-landscape

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Thanks!

A. **Safety basin** universally appears in open-source LLMs' parameter spaces. Randomly perturbing model weights maintains safety level of original aligned model (light purple dot) in its local neighborhood.





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