MixAT: Combining Continuous and Discrete Adversarial Training for LLMs


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Adversarial Vulnerability of Large Language Models

Malicious requests types. Source: [1]

Despite recent efforts in LLM safety and alignment, **adversarial attacks** on frontier LLMs can still **consistently force harmful generations**.

Although **adversarial training** has been widely studied and shown to significantly improve the robustness of **traditional machine learning models**, how to best leverage adversarial training **for LLMs remains an open question**.

[1] Mazeika et al. "Harmbench: A standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming and robust refusal."

Adversarial Attacks on LLMs



Unlike image-based adversarial attacks, **adversarial prompts** for **LLMs** involve **manipulations** of **discrete input text**, designed to elicit **harmful**, **unethical**, or **unintended** outputs.

Two main type of **text-based attacks**, are **prompt-level jailbreaks** (e.g. PAP) and **token-level attacks** (e.g. GCG)

Adversarial attacks can trick the LLMs into harmful generation.

Adversarial Training of LLMs

Increase the probability of the safe response for the adversarial inputs

Decrease the probability of the unsafe response for the adversarial input

Keep utility on generic LLM dataset

$$\min_{\theta} -\mathbb{E}_{(x,y,\hat{y})\in\mathcal{D}}\Big[\underbrace{\log f_\theta(y|x+\delta(x,\hat{y}))}_{\text{toward loss}} - \underbrace{\log f_\theta(\hat{y}|x+\delta(x,\hat{y}))}_{\text{away loss}}\Big] - \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\in\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{u}}\Big[\underbrace{\log f_\theta(y|x)}_{\text{utility loss}}\Big]$$

Adversarial training objective for CAT training. Source: [2]

[2] Xhonneux, Sophie, et al. "Efficient adversarial training in LLMs with continuous attacks."

Discrete vs Continuous Adversarial Training of LLMs



Continuous Adversarial Attacks. Source: [2]

Discrete adversarial training methods are often **effective** (e.g. R2D2), but training LLMs with concrete adversarial prompts is often **computationally expensive**.

Continuous adversarial training relies on continuous relaxations (e.g. CAT). Despite its **efficiency** and **generalization capabilities**, does **not** always **capture** the **full** spectrum of **vulnerabilities** exploited by discrete attacks.

[2] Xhonneux, Sophie, et al. "Efficient adversarial training in LLMs with continuous attacks."

Our Method: MixAT



Mixing discrete and continuous attack in MixAT

MixAT: Utility vs Robustness Trade-off



	Model	Utility Scores [%] ↑						Attack Success Rate [%] ↓							
		ARCe	ARCc	MMLU	Hless	MTB	XST	D.R.	PAP	TAP	PAIR	A.DAN	GCG	H.Jail	ALO
Zephyr-7B	No Defense (HF)	81.0	**55.2**	56.2	**100.0**	60.3	**98.8**	85.0	87.5	85.0	97.5	90.0	85.0	100.0	100.0
	R2D2 [5] (HF)	80.1	52.9	56.1	30.0	42.2	33.6	7.5	65.0	15.0	7.5	7.5	**0.0**	45.0	77.5
	CAT [7] (HF)	78.2	51.1	54.8	97.5	52.8	50.8	2.5	40.0	42.5	42.5	2.5	5.0	5.0	70.0
	CAT [7] (R)	78.2	50.5	54.5	95.0	52.3	50.0	**0.0**	25.0	27.5	55.0	**0.0**	12.5	**0.0**	67.5
	LAT KL [9] (R)	50.3	34.5	55.4	95.0	**60.9**	93.2	10.0	62.5	85.0	85.0	37.5	45.0	80.0	97.5
	LAT SFT [9] (R)	31.7	23.2	22.9	45.0	32.6	38.4	5.0	30.0	30.0	27.5	2.5	20.0	15.0	52.5
	PAP-AT	**82.3**	54.2	**56.4**	97.5	52.6	94.0	17.5	2.5	5.0	15.0	2.5	55.0	57.5	77.5
	DUALAT	81.8	54.4	56.1	85.0	51.1	47.2	2.5	2.5	10.0	15.0	**0.0**	10.0	2.5	22.5
	MIXAT	81.4	54.0	55.8	97.5	52.2	74.0	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	12.5	5.0	15.0
	MIXAT + GCG	81.6	54.5	55.9	92.5	51.1	56.4	2.5	**0.0**	2.5	5.0	**0.0**	2.5	2.5	**7.5**

MixAT: Training Resource Comparison

	Trained Model	GPUs used	VRAM (GB)	Train Time	Train Steps	Total Est. Costs ($)
Zephyr-7B	R2D2*	8xA100	?	16h00	2000	192.0
	CAT	2xA100	47	6h40	760	20.0
	LAT	1xH200	72	1h40	100	8.3
	PAP-AT	2xA100	43	2h50	300	8.9
	MixAT	2xA100	47	4h00	300	11.2
	MixAT	1xH200	52	2h05	300	10.6
	MixAT + GCG	1xH200	52	16h00	300	80.2
Qwen2.5-14B	CAT	2xH200	93	5h40	760	56.7
	LAT	1xH200	112	2h15	100	11.3
	PAP-AT	2xH200	102	2h30	300	25.4
	MixAT	2xH200	99	3h00	300	30.2
	MixAT + GCG	2xH200	120	24h15	300	242.7
Q-32B	CAT	2xH200	151	11h20	760	113.3
	PAP-AT	2xH200	182	3h00	300	30.4
	MixAT	2xH200	198	5h15	300	52.7

* for R2D2 we use the costs as reported by Mazeika et al. [5]

Discrete GCG training

Continuous Training

Estimated training costs for different methods across various models.

MixAT: Scaling the LoRA weights



ASR ↓ and Utility ↑ for MixAT and CAT with different λ scales.

Intuitively, the **strength** of the adversarial training can be changed by **scaling** the **LoRA** adapter **weights**, creating multiple **robustness-utility trade-offs** practically for no cost.

MixAT: Ablation studies



Additionally, we compare **MixAT** to using both discrete and continuous attacks directly for training the model (**DualAT**). We see that **the way MixAT combines the discrete and continuous** attacks results in **much better ALO.**

Further details can be found in the paper.

Arxiv

HuggingFace

Code