



FedRACE: A Hierarchical and Statistical Framework for Robust Federated Learning

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❑ Challenges:

- **Static Representation Space:** Frozen backbones make all clients share the same latent space, allowing malicious clients to inject semantic backdoors that spread globally
- **Gradient-Based Defenses Fail:** Without gradient signals, traditional defenses (e.g., Krum, FLTrust) relying on update distances lose effectiveness
- **Non-IID Data Amplifies Confusion:** Heterogeneous client data causes natural drift, making it hard to distinguish benign deviation from malicious manipulation
- **Lack of Statistical Interpretability:** Existing methods rely on heuristics, with no quantitative or explainable measure of semantic inconsistency

❑ Motivation:

Frozen-backbone FL improves efficiency but sacrifices robustness and transparency. We need a **new defense paradigm** that:


- Works without gradients
- Evaluates clients by semantic behavior
- And ensures statistical interpretability

→ This motivates ***FedRACE***, a framework combining hierarchical representation learning and statistical deviance analysis



□ Goal:


- Enable robust and interpretable federated learning under frozen-backbone settings
- Detect malicious clients and maintain global consistency without gradient information
- Bridge representation learning and statistical inference for explainable robustness



□ Core Components:

- **Hierarchical Statistical Network (HStat-Net):** Transforms frozen features into structured, low-dimensional embeddings, enhancing class separability and enabling semantic-level comparison across clients
- **Deviance-based Guard Mechanism (DevGuard):** Models each client's head as a GLM, measures semantic deviation from the global distribution via statistical deviance, and detects abnormal clients using an adaptive, theoretically grounded threshold





Architecture:

$$\phi(x) \rightarrow s(\phi(x)) \rightarrow h(s(\phi(x)))$$

- ϕ : Frozen feature extractor (e.g., CLIP)
- $s(\cdot)$: Statistical projection layer
- $h(\cdot)$: Lightweight task head

Two-phase Optimization:

- **Phase 1:** Fix $s(\cdot) \rightarrow$ train h with cross-entropy loss (task alignment)
- **Phase 2:** Fix $h(\cdot) \rightarrow$ train s with triplet loss (structural compactness)

→ Builds a linearly separable, statistically stable representation space, enabling semantic-level comparison and robust aggregation

Validation: The hierarchical features become linearly separable and semantically stable, enabling effective statistical evaluation in DevGuard design

Method	Raw	CLIP	HStat-Net
Fisher	0.149	0.480	1.602
MI	0.162	0.275	0.556



□ Core Idea:

- Model each client's head h_i as a Generalized Linear Model
- Compute deviance residuals Δ_i from predictions on global class representations
- Higher Δ_i indicates stronger semantic deviation from the global consensus

□ Formulation:

$$\Delta_i = \sum_c (-2 \cdot \log \hat{y}_i^c) \log(-2 \cdot \log \hat{y}_i^c)$$

where \hat{y}_i^c is the predicted probability for class c . Clients are ranked by Δ_i ; large values imply inconsistency.

□ Thresholding & Voting:

- **Sort** residuals $\Delta_{[1]} \leq \Delta_{[2]} \leq \dots \leq \Delta_{[n]}$
- For each candidate index p , **estimate** benign/malicious (μ_B, μ_M) and σ_p^2
- **Choose** \hat{p} to minimize the upper bound of total misclassification rate
- **Repeat** for K random subsets; clients flagged in $> \frac{K}{2}$ steps are marked malicious



5 Experimental Results

Dataset	Defense	Untargeted		Targeted					
		Min-Max	IPMA	TLFA		ECBA		DBA	
		ACC	ACC	ASR	ACC	BA	ACC	BA	ACC
CIFAR-100	Multi-krum	72.59 _{0.27}	76.16 _{0.32}	1.52 _{0.10}	75.93 _{0.28}	20.05 _{0.11}	76.03 _{0.31}	23.20 _{0.28}	75.68 _{0.27}
	Trimmed-mean	75.15 _{0.35}	76.43 _{0.27}	1.79 _{0.25}	75.83 _{0.24}	10.34 _{0.26}	76.53 _{0.26}	12.16 _{0.29}	76.65 _{0.26}
	FLAIR	73.07 _{0.29}	75.74 _{0.27}	0.61 _{0.16}	74.49 _{0.30}	1.30 _{0.23}	76.21 _{0.32}	0.96 _{0.17}	75.65 _{0.28}
	FedRoLA	76.05 _{0.33}	76.84 _{0.28}	11.92 _{0.28}	74.88 _{0.29}	39.28 _{0.28}	76.47 _{0.30}	2.89 _{0.28}	77.04 _{0.27}
	FLShield	76.86 _{0.24}	76.66 _{0.25}	2.27 _{0.29}	75.63 _{0.28}	1.67 _{0.28}	76.81 _{0.27}	1.46 _{0.27}	76.99 _{0.31}
	FEDRACE	76.69 _{0.32}	76.99 _{0.32}	0.07 _{0.10}	77.02 _{0.33}	0.06 _{0.11}	76.98 _{0.31}	0.36 _{0.23}	77.21 _{0.31}
Food-101	Multi-krum	52.31 _{0.33}	55.70 _{0.27}	2.07 _{0.13}	55.85 _{0.27}	20.22 _{0.13}	55.87 _{0.28}	49.13 _{0.30}	55.23 _{0.29}
	Trimmed-mean	54.37 _{0.31}	56.37 _{0.31}	2.34 _{0.26}	56.08 _{0.28}	27.58 _{0.29}	56.22 _{0.32}	30.84 _{0.29}	56.54 _{0.29}
	FLAIR	53.16 _{0.30}	54.27 _{0.30}	0.43 _{0.15}	52.09 _{0.29}	5.67 _{0.30}	55.24 _{0.29}	1.48 _{0.25}	53.33 _{0.29}
	FedRoLA	56.40 _{0.29}	55.59 _{0.29}	12.74 _{0.29}	54.10 _{0.29}	45.27 _{0.26}	56.16 _{0.31}	8.14 _{0.28}	56.51 _{0.28}
	FLShield	56.24 _{0.29}	56.07 _{0.31}	14.02 _{0.32}	54.76 _{0.30}	6.36 _{0.29}	56.25 _{0.31}	1.44 _{0.28}	56.65 _{0.27}
	FEDRACE	56.38 _{0.27}	56.76 _{0.26}	0.27 _{0.16}	56.68 _{0.27}	0.31 _{0.16}	56.70 _{0.26}	1.01 _{0.31}	56.72 _{0.27}
Tiny ImageNet	Multi-krum	71.04 _{0.32}	72.38 _{0.28}	0.63 _{0.10}	72.70 _{0.27}	19.27 _{0.12}	72.85 _{0.27}	45.71 _{0.29}	72.05 _{0.28}
	Trimmed-mean	71.95 _{0.28}	72.44 _{0.29}	0.95 _{0.22}	72.74 _{0.28}	33.06 _{0.28}	72.33 _{0.30}	35.09 _{0.23}	72.67 _{0.25}
	FLAIR	71.23 _{0.35}	72.59 _{0.28}	0.28 _{0.19}	70.58 _{0.28}	4.43 _{0.28}	71.89 _{0.28}	0.24 _{0.15}	70.91 _{0.30}
	FedRoLA	73.36 _{0.21}	72.78 _{0.29}	4.87 _{0.27}	71.92 _{0.29}	47.14 _{0.28}	72.73 _{0.25}	4.75 _{0.28}	73.13 _{0.21}
	FLShield	73.29 _{0.24}	73.19 _{0.32}	9.85 _{0.28}	71.84 _{0.29}	5.84 _{0.28}	73.11 _{0.28}	0.53 _{0.19}	73.21 _{0.32}
	FEDRACE	73.06 _{0.29}	73.40 _{0.29}	0.07 _{0.10}	73.24 _{0.31}	0.08 _{0.10}	73.44 _{0.29}	0.13 _{0.13}	73.42 _{0.29}

□ Across all datasets and attack types, FEDRACE achieves the best performance:

- Highest clean accuracy (e.g., 76–77% on CIFAR-100, 56–57% on Food-101)
- Lowest attack success rates, even under severe targeted attacks

□ Competing methods show clear weaknesses:

- FLAIR and FedRoLA exhibit residual backdoor effects (ASR up to 40 %)
- FLShield performs better but still trails FEDRACE, especially on complex datasets

→ FedRACE's advantage is **consistent** across both untargeted and targeted settings, indicating robust global model stability under frozen-backbone constraints.



FedRACE introduces a new defense paradigm for FL:

- ☐ Learns hierarchical statistical representations for semantic alignment
- ☐ Performs statistical deviance evaluation for reliable client assessment
- ❖ Works without gradient information and achieves **reliable robustness** across diverse datasets and attacks
- ❖ Offers **theoretical guarantees** on detection mechanism and demonstrates scalability in large federated systems

Thank You

