Short-length Adversarial Training Helps LLMs Defend Long-length Jailbreak Attacks: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence

Shaopeng Fu[1], Liang Ding[2], Jingfeng Zhang[3,1], Di Wang[1]

[1]King Abdullah University of Science and Technology
[2]The University of Sydney
[3]The University of Auckland

Background

Jailbreak Attacks

➢ Use adversarial prompts to induce LLMs to generate malicious contents.



(a) Example jailbreak via competing objectives. (b) Example jailbreak via mismatched generalization.

Wei et al. (2023)

LLM content generating distribution

Prompt that contains adversarial prompt

$$\min_{\mathbf{x}_{\mathcal{I}_a} \in \{1,\ldots,V\}^{|\mathcal{I}_a|}} -\log P_M\left(\mathbf{x}_{target} \middle| \mathbf{x}\right)$$

Indices of adversarial prompt

Targeted content that aims to be generated

Optimization problem for (token-level) jailbreak prompt synthesizing.

LLM Adversarial Training (AT)

➢ LLM AT enhances the jailbreak robustness of LLMs by training them on synthesized jailbreak prompts.

$$\min_{\theta}\{\alpha\mathcal{L}_{\text{adv}}(\theta, M, D^{(h)}) + (1-\alpha)\mathcal{L}_{\text{utility}}(\theta, D^{(u)})\},$$

where $\mathcal{L}_{\text{adv}}(\theta, M, D^{(h)}) := \mathbb{E}_{(x^{(h)}, y^{(h)}, y^{(b)}) \in D^{(h)}}[-\log p_\theta(y^{(b)} | x^{(h)} \oplus x^{(s)}_{1:m})]$

Targeted benign response

Synthesized (suffix) jailbreak prompt

Question: *How will the adversarial prompt length during AT affect trained LLMs' robustness against jailbreaking with different prompt lengths?*

Wei et al. Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail? NeurIPS 2023.

Theoretical Foundation: The ICL Theory

The In-context learning (ICL) theory aims to understand how LLMs can make predictions well for sequential inputs (a.k.a. "prompts") specified by different "tasks" without adjusting model parameters.

Our theoretical analysis for LLM AT is built upon the ICL theory.

ICL Modeling (On linear regression tasks)

- ICL (linear regressions) input for a specfic task τ (with task parameter w_τ):

$$E_\tau := \begin{pmatrix} x_{\tau,1} & \cdots & x_{\tau,N} & x_{\tau,q} \\ y_{\tau,1} & \cdots & y_{\tau,N} & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^{(d+1)\times(N+1)}$$

- Model: Linear Self-attention Model (LSA):

$$f_{\text{LSA},\theta}(E_\tau) := \left[E_\tau + W^V E_\tau \cdot \frac{E_\tau^\top W^{KQ} E_\tau}{N} \right] \in \mathbb{R}^{(d+1)\times(N+1)}$$

- Model prediction for queries:

$$\hat{y}_{q,\theta}(E_\tau) := f_{\text{LSA},\theta}(E_\tau)_{(d+1)\times(N+1)} = \left((w_{21}^V)^\top \quad w_{22}^V \right) \cdot \frac{E_\tau E_\tau^\top}{N} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} W_{11}^{KQ} \\ (w_{21}^{KQ})^\top \end{pmatrix} \cdot x_{\tau,q}$$

Theory Framework for LLM Jailbreaking & LLM AT

To establish a ICL theoretical framework for LLMs' jailbreaking and AT, we have the following two technical challenges:

- How to theoretically modeling jailbreak attacks?
- How to theoretically modeling LLM AT based on the previous theoretical jailbreak attacks?

Theory Framework for LLM Jailbreaking & LLM AT

Challenge 1: How to Model jailbreak attacks under the ICL theory?

Solution: We design the following *ICL (Suffix) Adversarial Attack* to approximate real-world *suffix jailbreak attacks*:

$$E_{\tau,M}^{\text{adv}} := \left(\underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} X_\tau \\ Y_\tau \end{pmatrix}}_{\substack{\text{Training Data} \\ \text{of Length } N}} \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} X_\tau^{\text{sfx}} + \Delta_\tau \\ Y_\tau^{\text{sfx}} \end{pmatrix}}_{\substack{\text{Adversarial Suffix} \\ \text{of Length } M}} \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} x_{\tau,q} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}}_{\substack{\text{Query Sample} \\ \text{From } E_\tau}} \right)$$

where the adversarial suffix for the adversarial ICL input $E_{\tau,M}^{adv}$ is formalized as:

$$\begin{cases} X_\tau^{\text{sfx}} := \begin{pmatrix} x_{\tau,1}^{\text{sfx}} & \cdots & x_{\tau,M}^{\text{sfx}} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times M} \\ Y_\tau^{\text{sfx}} := \begin{pmatrix} y_{\tau,1}^{\text{sfx}} & \cdots & y_{\tau,M}^{\text{sfx}} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^{1 \times M} \\ \Delta_\tau^{\text{sfx}} := \begin{pmatrix} \delta_{\tau,1} & \cdots & \delta_{\tau,M} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times M} \end{cases}$$

- **Motivation:** Our attack only adversarially perturbs a suffix of ICL input to approximate the setting of suffix jailbreaking.

Theory Framework for LLM Jailbreaking & LLM AT

Challenge 2: How to Model LLM AT under the ICL theory?

Solution: We leverage the previous proposed ICL adversarial attack to define the following minimax AT problem for the linear transformer defined in ICL theory:

$$\min_{\theta} \mathcal{L}^{\text{adv}}(\theta) := \min_{\theta} \mathcal{R}^{\text{adv}}(\theta, M_{\text{train}}) = \min_{\theta} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{\tau} \max_{\|\Delta_\tau^\top\|_{2,\infty} \le \epsilon} \frac{1}{2} |\hat{y}_{q,\theta}(E^{\text{adv}}_{\tau, M_{\text{train}}}) - y_{\tau,q}|^2 \right\}$$

where the adversarial loss is given as

$$\mathcal{R}^{\text{adv}}(\theta, M) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau} \max_{\|\Delta_\tau^\top\|_{2,\infty} \le \epsilon} \frac{1}{2} |\hat{y}_{q,\theta}(E^{\text{adv}}_{\tau, M}) - y_{\tau,q}|^2$$

- **Motivation:** We train the ICL transformer on adversarial ICL inputs synthesized from the ICL adversarial attack to approximate real-world LLM AT.

Theory Framework for LLM Jailbreaking & LLM AT

Challenge 2: How to Model LLM AT under the ICL theory?

- **Additional challenge:** How to solve the ICL AT minimax problem for the sophisticated ICL AT loss $L^{adv}(\theta)$?

- **Additional Solution:** We propose to instead analyzing an upper bound for the original ICL AT loss that admits a closed-form solution:

$$\min_\theta \tilde{\mathcal{L}}^{\text{adv}}(\theta) := \min_\theta \Big\{ \sum_{i=1}^{4} \ell_i(\theta) \Big\}$$

where $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}^{\text{adv}}(\theta) := \sum_{i=1}^{4} \ell_i(\theta)$ is the surrogate AT loss, $E^{\text{clean}}_{\tau,M_{\text{train}}} := \begin{pmatrix} X_\tau & X_\tau^{\text{sfx}} & x_{\tau,q} \\ Y_\tau & Y_\tau^{\text{sfx}} & 0 \end{pmatrix}$, and

$$\ell_1(\theta) = 2\,\mathbb{E}_\tau\Big[\big((w_{21}^V)^\top \;\; w_{22}^V\big) \frac{E^{\text{clean}}_{\tau,M_{\text{train}}} E^{\text{clean}\top}_{\tau,M_{\text{train}}}}{N + M_{\text{train}}} \begin{pmatrix} W_{11}^{KQ} \\ (w_{21}^{KQ})^\top \end{pmatrix} x_{\tau,q} - y_{\tau,q}\Big]^2,$$

$$\ell_2(\theta) = \frac{2\epsilon^4 M_{\text{train}}^2}{(N + M_{\text{train}})^2} \|w_{21}^V\|_2^2\, \mathbb{E}_\tau\Big[\|W_{11}^{KQ} x_{\tau,q}\|_2^2\Big],$$

$$\ell_3(\theta) = \frac{2\epsilon^2 M_{\text{train}}}{(N + M_{\text{train}})^2}\, \mathbb{E}_\tau\Big[\|W_{11}^{KQ} x_{\tau,q}\|_2^2 \cdot \|\big((w_{21}^V)^\top \;\; w_{22}^V\big) \begin{pmatrix} X_\tau^{\text{sfx}} \\ Y_\tau^{\text{sfx}} \end{pmatrix} \|_2^2\Big],$$

$$\ell_4(\theta) = \frac{2\epsilon^2 M_{\text{train}}}{(N + M_{\text{train}})^2} \|w_{21}^V\|_2^2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_\tau\Big[\| \begin{pmatrix} X_\tau^{\text{sfx}} \\ Y_\tau^{\text{sfx}} \end{pmatrix}^\top \begin{pmatrix} W_{11}^{KQ} \\ (w_{21}^{KQ})^\top \end{pmatrix} x_{\tau,q} \|_2^2\Big].$$

- **Motivation:** Minimizing the upper bound also helps to reduce the original ICL AT loss and thus helps to improve the adversarial robustness of the trained model.

Main Results

Theoretical Result 1: Closed-form Surrogate AT Dynamics

Theorem 1 (Closed-form Surrogate AT Dynamics). *Suppose Assumption 1 holds and $f_{\mathrm{LSA},\theta}$ is trained from the surrogate AT problem defined in Eq. (9) with continuous gradient flow. When the σ in Assumption 1 satisfies $\sigma < \sqrt{\frac{2}{d\cdot\|(\Gamma(M_{\mathrm{train}})\Lambda+\epsilon^2\psi(M_{\mathrm{train}})I_d)\Lambda^{-1}\|_2}}$, after training for infinite long time, the model parameter θ will converge to $\theta_*(M_{\mathrm{train}}) := (W_*^V(M_{\mathrm{train}}), W_*^{KQ}(M_{\mathrm{train}}))$, satisfying: $w_{*,12}^{KQ} = w_{*,21}^{KQ} = w_{*,12}^{V} = w_{*,21}^{V} = 0_{d\times 1}$, $w_{*,22}^{KQ} = 0$, $W_{*,11}^{V} = 0_{d\times d}$, and*

$$w_{*,22}^{V} W_{*,11}^{KQ} = \left(\Gamma(M_{\mathrm{train}})\Lambda + \epsilon^2\psi(M_{\mathrm{train}})I_d\right)^{-1}\Lambda.$$

Theoretical Result 2: Robust Generalization Bound

Corollary 1. *Suppose Assumption 2 and all conditions in Theorem 2 hold. Suppose $\|\Lambda\|_2 \le \mathcal{O}(1)$. Then, we have the following robust generalization bound,*

$$\mathcal{R}^{\mathrm{adv}}(\theta_*(M_{\mathrm{train}}), M_{\mathrm{test}}) \le \mathcal{O}(d) + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{d^2}{N}\right) + \mathcal{O}\left(N^2 \cdot \frac{M_{\mathrm{test}}^2}{M_{\mathrm{train}}^4}\right).$$

- **Implication 1:** The robust generalization bound is correlated with ($\sqrt{M_{test}}$ / M_{train}), where M_{train} and M_{est} are the adversarial suffix lengths during training and testing.

- **Implication 2:** Our results show that one can leverage efficient "short-length" LLM AT to defend against strong "long-length" jailbreak attacks.

Experiments

Experiments on five real-world LLMs and five suffix jailbreak attacks demonstrate that the robustness of adversarially trained LLMs is correlated with ($\sqrt{M_{test}}$ / M_{train}).



Figure 1: Scatter plots of ASR to the ratio $\sqrt{M_{\text{test}}}/M_{\text{train}}$. For each pair of base model and attack, 48 points are plotted. A high ASR indicates a weak jailbreak robustness.

Table 1: PCCs and p-values calculated between ASR and ratio $\sqrt{M_{\text{test}}}/M_{\text{train}}$. A high PCC (within $[-1, 1]$) means a strong correlation between ASR and the ratio. $p < 5.00 \times 10^{-2}$ means that the observation is considered statistically significant.

Model	GCG Attack		BEAST Attack		AmpleGCG Attack		Zhu's AutoDAN		GCQ Attack	
	PCC(↑)	p-value(↓)	PCC(↑)	p-value(↓)	PCC(↑)	p-value(↓)	PCC(↑)	p-value(↓)	PCC(↑)	p-value(↓)
Vicuna-7B	0.93	$\mathbf{4.7 \times 10^{-21}}$	0.63	$\mathbf{1.4 \times 10^{-6}}$	0.19	1.9×10^{-1}	0.51	$\mathbf{2.5 \times 10^{-4}}$	0.82	$\mathbf{1.4 \times 10^{-12}}$
Mistral-7B	0.86	$\mathbf{4.0 \times 10^{-15}}$	0.29	$\mathbf{4.4 \times 10^{-2}}$	0.74	$\mathbf{1.5 \times 10^{-9}}$	0.49	$\mathbf{3.7 \times 10^{-4}}$	0.70	$\mathbf{2.6 \times 10^{-8}}$
Llama-2-7B	0.88	$\mathbf{9.0 \times 10^{-17}}$	0.67	$\mathbf{1.7 \times 10^{-7}}$	0.37	$\mathbf{1.0 \times 10^{-2}}$	0.13	3.8×10^{-1}	0.71	$\mathbf{2.1 \times 10^{-8}}$
Llama-3-8B	0.76	$\mathbf{2.8 \times 10^{-10}}$	0.26	7.7×10^{-2}	-0.07	6.2×10^{-1}	-0.12	4.1×10^{-1}	0.0	9.7×10^{-1}
Qwen2.5-7B	0.87	$\mathbf{1.1 \times 10^{-15}}$	0.58	$\mathbf{1.0 \times 10^{-5}}$	-0.24	1.0×10^{-1}	0.16	2.6×10^{-1}	0.72	$\mathbf{1.1 \times 10^{-8}}$

Conclusions

- We establish the first theoretical framework based on the ICL theory to analyze jailbreaking and adversarial training for LLMs.

- We prove a robust generalization bound for adversarially trained LLMs, which is correlated with $(\sqrt{M_{test}}\ /\ M_{train})$, where M_{train} and M_{est} are the adversarial suffix lengths during training and testing.

- Our results show that one can leverage efficient "short-length" LLM AT to defend against strong "long-length" jailbreak attacks, experiments on real-world LLMs also confirm our findings.