# Near-Optimal Regret-Queue Length Tradeoff in Online Learning for Two-Sided Markets

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#### **Two-Sided Markets**



Ride-Hailing



**Organ Donation** 




#### Meal/Grocery Delivery



Crowdsourcing

#### Model: Two-Sided Queues



## Objectives

 $\square$  Maximize  $E\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T} \operatorname{Profit}(t)\right]$ 

Monotone assumption

 $\square$  Minimize AvgQLen $(T) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} E[\text{total-queue-length}(t)]$ 

## **Objectives**

#### Question:

If the demand and supply functions are **unknown**, how should the platform do pricing and matching?


## Fluid Baseline and Regret

☐ Fluid baseline [Varma et al., 2023]:

$$\max_{\lambda,\mu,x} E[\operatorname{Profit}(\lambda,\mu)]$$

A concave function of  $(\lambda, \mu)$ 


s.t. 
$$\lambda_i = \sum_j x_{i,j}$$
,  $\mu_j = \sum_i x_{i,j}$ ,  $x_{i,j} \ge 0$ ,  $\lambda_i, \mu_j \in [0, 1]$ , for all  $i, j$ 



- $\square$  Regret:  $E[R(T)] = T \times Profit^* E[\sum_{t=1}^{T} Profit(t)]$
- ☐ Minimize E[R(T)]Minimize AvgQLen $(T) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} E[\text{total-queue-length}(t)]$

# Fundamental Regret-Queue Length Tradeoff

□ A lower bound result [**Y** et al., 2025]: there exists a problem instance such that, for any policy in a large class of pricing policies, if  $AvgQLen(T) \le T^{\gamma/2}$ ,  $E[R(T)] = \Omega(T^{1-\gamma})$  for any  $\gamma \in \left[0, \frac{1}{2}\right]$ .



# Results [Y et al., 2025]

 $\square$  For any  $\gamma \in \left[0, \frac{1}{6}\right]$ , we have  $E[R(T)] = \tilde{O}(T^{1-\gamma})$ ,  $AvgQLen(T) = \tilde{O}\left(T^{\gamma/2}\right)$ 

