


# CoP: Agentic Red-Teaming for Large Language Models using Composition-of-Principles

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#### The CoP Framework




#### **Components**

- Red-Teaming Agent: An LLM that orchestrates the attack by composing principles.
- Target LLM: The model under test, which receives the jailbreak prompt.
- Judge LLM: An LLM that evaluates if the attack was successful and provides feedback.



#### **Iterative Refinement**

#### (c) Iterative Optimization of CoP




#### **Components**

- Initial Seed Generation: Transforms the harmful query to avoid the agent's own safety filters (the "Direct Refusal" problem).
- Composition & Refinement: The agent applies a new CoP strategy in each iteration.
- Dual-Judge Evaluation:
- **Jailbreak Score:** How successful was the attack? (Scale 1-10)
- Similarity Score: Did the prompt stay true to the original harmful intent?
- Feedback Loop: The system keeps the best-performing prompt for the next iteration.



#### **CoP Achieves State-of-the-Art Attack Success**



- Open-Source Models: Achieves 72.5% ASR on Llama-2-70B, far surpassing the next best baseline (<50%).
- Proprietary Models: Unprecedented success against highly-aligned models.
  - **88.75%** on GPT-4-Turbo
  - 38.0% on Claude-3.5 Sonnet (a 19x improvement over baselines).

## **CoP** is Dramatically More Efficient


<b>Target Models</b>	Metrics	PAIR	TAP	AutoDAN-Turbo	CoP (Ours)
Gemini	Query Time [\$\dagger]	6.50	12.79	2.76	1.357
	ASR [↑]	43.00	57.40	66.30	78.00
GPT-4-1106-Preview	<b>Query Time</b> [↓]	12.11	26.08	5.63	1.512
	ASR [↑]	31.60	35.80	88.50	88.75

- Metric: Average query count to the target LLM for a successful attack.
- On GPT-4:
  - CoP: 1.5 queries
  - TAP: 26.1 queries (**17.2x more** queries)
  - PAIR: 12.1 queries (**8x more** queries)

The strategic nature of CoP avoids wasteful, random searches.



### **CoP Provides Transparent, Actionable Insights**



- > By analyzing successful attacks, we can identify the most effective principle compositions.
  - > Finding 1: Expand is the most effective single principle (12% of successes).
  - Finding 2: Combinations like Expand + Phrase Insertion (9.8%) and Expand + Style Change (6.0%) are highly effective.
- ➤ **Insight for Defenders:** LLM defenses are vulnerable to harmful intent being diluted or hidden within a larger, benign-sounding context.







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# **Thank**

You