Position: Without Global Governance, AI-Enabled Biodesign Tools Risk Dangerous Proliferation

Convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and biotechnology has fundamentally altered the biosecurity threat landscape. Generative AI tools are transforming biological design from an empirical science into a systematic engineering discipline, capable of creating novel biological agents with unprecedented precision and potency. This new reality renders existing biosecurity frameworks, which were primarily designed to prevent misuse by non-state actors, largely obsolete against a sophisticated state adversary. Current measures, such as the screening of DNA synthesis orders, are insufficient because they are predicated on static lists of known pathogens that can be easily circumvented by AI-enabled innovation. In this position paper, we argue that the international community must establish a new, multi-stakeholder governance framework. The critical line of defense must shift from controlling the biological products themselves to regulating access to the most powerful dual-use AI biodesign tools. This framework would not stifle beneficial open research but instead implement a tiered control system, analogous to export controls on dual-use technologies. It would involve the establishment of an international registry to classify AI models by risk, controlled access to the most capable systems for vetted entities, and the creation of an "International Bioscience Response Reserve" (IBRR) to ensure equitable access during public health emergencies. Ultimately, this approach advocates for a proactive and preemptive international response, recognizing that waiting for a catastrophic incident to trigger regulation is a dangerous and irresponsible strategy.